To what extent can the PC and the FEP help us when faced with the task of explaining the metaphysical “me”? Here, I will say that, unlike the phenomenal “I,” the questions related to the metaphysical “me” are beyond his reach. The reason is that the PC is fundamentally agnostic when it comes to what figurative content brings to the extent of conscious experience. In general, this can be seen as an advantage because pc accounts of personal experience can thus avoid the burden of being hostage to a certain theory of consciousness and, in principle, remain compatible with most of them (z.B. see Hohwy, 2013, chapter 10 to try to combine PC with ideas from the theory of global neural workspace In: Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, 2014). However, it also makes PC fundamentally underspecified if is treated as a theory that is used to explain issues related to consciousness. While, as has already been proposed, the PC is a valuable scaffold to describe the representational structure that underlies conscious content, it runs into problems when used to explain why certain content is conscious. One of the ways in which the PC and the FEP can try to keep their relevance is to explain awareness of access (Block, 1995) – a functional mechanism that allows “certain information visited to eventually enter our consciousness and become mandatory for others” (Dehaene, 2014). However, the problem of the metaphysical “me” only becomes a relevant subject when it is addressed in the context of phenomenal consciousness – the type of consciousness charged by the weight of the so-called “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1996). If qualia are not qualities of experience, as some philosophers assert on the basis of a call to introspection, and the only characteristics revealed by introspection are qualities represented by experiences (qualities which, in case of perception, belong to something, to external things), a naturally opposite suggestion is that Qualia is a true representative content of experiences in which the qualities represented.