Legally binding: on many issues, the Paris Agreement allows its meeting of the contracting parties to adopt binding rules. But the question of whether the parties would choose to exercise this power within the Rules of Paris remained open during the negotiations. This debate was repeated by a disagreement over how to characterize the subject of the negotiations – in terms of “Paris rules” or “Paris guidelines”. Footnote 23 While draft negotiating texts for the other part of the regulation were gradually reduced during this two-week meeting, sections of Article 6 remained blocked, with 132 unresolved passages contained in “hooks” shown in red in the table below. Nevertheless, the new rules remain undecided in a crucial area. While the world can now see how far we are lagging behind in the necessary measures to combat climate change, the rules do not allow countries to raise their game to the required level. The challenge this presents stems from the fact that Article 6 was the only part of the Paris regulatory framework that could not be agreed at COP24 in December 2018. A corresponding option in the draft text relating to Article 6.2 indicates that the general requirements for the prevention of double counts already adopted under paragraph 77, point d), of the Paris Regulation would be “supecede[d] by the provisions of Article 6. The statement against it is an attempt to reopen the debate. The arrival of a Paris agreement that satisfied everyone meant that a certain degree of “constructive ambiguity” would remain in the text.
This means that there was room for a series of interpretations in the formulation of the rules. The graph also shows how the draft texts of Article 6 seem to have receded after discussions in Bonn in June 2019 (right column in the graph). The draft legislation of Article 6.2, Article 6.4 and Article 6.8 includes, on the one hand, 41 pages containing 672 brackets. There are strong differences of opinion on how OMGE should be guaranteed in practice. A similar menu of options is discussed for the section 6.4 regulatory framework. Here, too, the option is to provide a temporary exemption for credits negotiated outside the scope of an NDC. 1 Decisions adopted in Katowice can be found in the Katowice Climate Package (UNFCCC) . The three separate mechanisms – in accordance with Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 – were all part of the Paris Agreement, in recognition of the competing interests and priorities between the contracting parties to the agreement. These differences remain and need to be reviewed if the section 6 regulatory framework is to be adopted. These “Article 6” rules on carbon markets and other forms of international cooperation are the last piece of the Paris regime to be resolved after the rest of its “regulatory corpus” was adopted at the end of 2018.
This highlights a reason for disagreement with Article 6.4, namely that cdM hosts did not have specific Kyoto emission reduction targets, meaning that economies cannot be “counted twice” towards more than one target. To finalize the rules, negotiators must navigate the text through a thicket of impenetrable jargon, a series of technical accounting challenges and bear traps of “constructive ambiguity” that often hide incompatible views on how Article 6 should work and why it was created. Article 14 of the Paris Agreement requires the meeting of the contracting parties to “regularly draw up an inventory of the implementation of this agreement in order to assess the progress made together in achieving the objective of this agreement and its long-term objectives.” Footnote 99 This global inventory plays a key role in the “round of ambition” of the agreement, conducting a five-year assessment of the parties` joint progress, which is to inform the parties about updating and improving their NPNS and their support.